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REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONS*
Louis Henkin**
The year 1989 marks important bicentennials in both the United
States and France. For the United States, 1989 is the bicentennial of
the Constitution and of rights: In 1789 the Constitution came into effect
and the first Congress adopted the Amendments that came to be known
as the Bill of Rights, both realizations of the promises of the American
Revolution. In France, 1989 is the bicentennial of the Revolution and
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Re-
volution's most noble, and perhaps most enduring, product. 1989, then,
would seem to be a particularly appropriate time for contemplating and
comparing the experiences of the two countries over the past two hundred
years in securing the rights that their respective revolutions promised.
This article is divided into two parts. The first, entitled "Rights
and Revolutions," examines the original affinity, as well as the differ-
ences, between the American and French Revolutions and between their
respective commitments to individual rights. I then chart the striking
divergence as to the treatment of rights in the United States and France
in the years following the revolutions. In the second part, entitled ".Rights
and Constitutions Today," I examine the contemporary rapprochement
between the American and French "rights systems," focusing on con-
stitutions in one of their widely accepted characteristics-as reflections,
repositories, and guardians of individual rights. I suggest that the dif-
ferences between the two systems as to the rights protected and the
means of providing that protection are in large measure attributable to
the manner and time of the constitutionalization of rights in each coun-
try.
I. RIGHTS AND THE REVOLUTIONS
Both the United States and France underwent revolutions in the
eighteenth century, revolutions that were among the most significant in
Western history. The two revolutions were intimately related in several
respects. France supported the American Revolution and the French
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regarded many of our revolutionary leaders as heroes. Franklin and
Jefferson, in particular, were honored visitors in France during the years
between the two revolutions and George Washington was admired from
afar. During the French Revolution, Thomas Jefferson was in France.
Thomas Paine inspired both revolutions.
The two revolutions were related in more fundamental respects. Both
revolutions claimed that their central motivation was to secure funda-
mental human rights. The American Declaration of Independence remains
probably the most famous articulation of the idea of rights. In France,
the National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen during the early days of the Revolution.
The two declarations of rights had common origins. The idea of
rights that was formally articulated in America in 1776 had European
roots, in the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Americans
modified their ideas and these modifications also influenced the French.
In France, revolutionary leaders invoked the American Declaration of
Independence as the voice of reason, and proclaimed its principles as
universal. Lafayette came home to France after the American Revolution
with a copy of the Virginia Bill of Rights, a close cousin of our
Declaration of Independence. On July 12, 1789, two days before the
Bastille fell, Lafayette asked the National Assembly to adopt a decla-
ration of rights drawing on bills of rights of the states of the United
States. In August, the Assembly adopted the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
The American declarations of rights and the French Declaration have
essential similarities both in spirit and in detail. For a brief time, the
two countries remained similar in their commitments to rights and in
the regimes they established to secure them. In 1789, the French Assembly
adopted its Declaration and the United States Congress approved the
Bill of Rights. In 1791, the Bill of Rights became a part of the United
States Constitution and the French adopted a constitution that included
the Declaration. But after 1793 the French commitment to a government
based on rights and exhibiting some separation of powers began to fail.
The King lost his crown and, soon, also his head. Then came the Reign
of Terror, civil and external war, and the rule of Bonaparte. Thereafter,
the French commitment to constitutionalism, including the recognition
and protection of constitutional rights, Was at best erratic.
From 1793 to 1945, the political histories of the two countries
diverged sharply. During those 150 years, the United States knew only
one republic. During the same 150 years, France, beginning with an
absolute monarchy, had three constitutional monarchies, two empires,
three republics, and the Vichy government. To date, while the United
States has had one constitution, or at most two (some call the Civil
War Amendments a "second constitution"), France has had sixteen
constitutions and draft constitutions. It has been called the greatest
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producer-and consumer-of constitutions in the Western world, perhaps
in the whole world, perhaps in all history.
The two countries diverged not only in their constitutional politics
but also in their commitments to rights. During 200 years of transfor-
mation, with a Civil War, two world wars, and rise to superpower
status, the United States continued on the rights path. The Bill of Rights
remained intact and the federal courts expanded and enriched it by
interpretation. Most of the later amendments to the Constitution were
rights-related or rights-inspired. The constitutional jurisprudence of the
United States is rich with rights.
France, tog, was conceived in rights but the French experience with
rights was quite different. The French Declaration, proclaimed in 1789,
was included in the Constitutions of 1791 and 1793, but between those
constitutions and the most recent French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958,
more than 150 years, the Declaration was in limbo, at best a brooding
presence. Sometimes it was invoked; often it was denounced. The French
Declaration states that "any society in which rights are not guaranteed,
or in which the separation of powers is not defined, has no constitu-
tion,"' but, in France, for 150 years, the separation of powers was the
focus of controversy, and political leaders paid little attention to rights.
Even during the later French revolutions, rights were not of central
concern; certainly they were not guaranteed or assured after those re-
volutions. The liberal, progressive spirits of France went in a different
direction toward other goals.
There are no clear, easy explanations for this sharp divergence in
the "rights" histories of the two countries. I suggest that a principal
reason is that the American and the French revolutions were funda-
mentally different and that the relationships between the revolutions and
the idea of rights were different. What is more, the commitments to
rights in the two revolutions were significantly different.
That the revolutions of France and of the American colonies were
different is widely recognized. As revolutions go, the American Revo-
lution was modest. It has been called "a 'safe and sane' revolution of
gentlemen, by gentlemen, and for gentlemen." ' 2 In fact, it was not a
revolution at all, but a "war of independence." (The social and economic
revolution did not really begin in the United States until the nineteenth
century and the end of slavery.) The British called the struggle of the
colonies a revolution, and labeled those who participated in it "rebels"
(and therefore "traitors"). Americans did well to call the struggle a war
of independence. Today it might be called a war of "people's liberation,"
a war for self-determination against external and distant forces.
1. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, art. 16.
2. J. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 498 (1943).
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The American Revolution-we do call it that-was virtually complete
in 1776. It was a simple and irrevocable cutting of ties with the mother
country. The American Revolution was not bloody. Surely there was
little internal bleeding, that is, little civil war, and, on the whole, the
revolution left few internal scars. Many loyalists left the United States,
but among those who did not, few were "irreconcilables."
The United States never looked back behind its revolution, never
regretted or questioned it; rather, the new country built on that revo-
lution. Once ties to England were eliminated, there were inevitable,
consequential political changes, but not many social or cultural changes.
Political and legal institutions continued, minus their English links and
cleansed of their English character. In fact, much of English political
and legal culture was retained, including the common law, and various
English institutions were adapted to serve America's unique needs. The
revolution encountered little resistance from any pre-existing institutions
or their supporters. In the history of the United States, then, the
revolution and its rhetoric remained a positive influence and a source
of pride. Ultimately, the revolution was incorporated into a national,
constitutional ideology.
France's revolution was different. It was wholly internal. The rev-
olution was resisted by powerful, deeply-rooted institutions and met
powerful internal opposition. The revolution was bloody, and culminated
in a reign of terror that rent French society. And the French Revolution
did not end: the ideological struggle it reflected and perspectives on the
desirability, purpose, and character of the revolution have continued to
divide France virtually until the present day.
What happened to rights in each country following its revolution
was shaped by the place of rights in the particular revolution.
Rights and the American Revolution
The idea of rights was in the American air before the Revolution,
and it remained there after the Revolution. The idea of rights, however,
did not lead to the Revolution, did not depend on the Revolution, and,
in fact, did not have much to do with the Revolution. Jefferson did
invoke the notion of rights to justify the colonists' demands for inde-
pendence and "self-determination," but he did not really need to talk
of rights at all. He could have satisfied the requirements of "a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind" with the same declaration, with
the same list of grievances, without the ten lines of rights rhetoric.
Presumably, Jefferson and the others inserted the rights paragraph
because they did not wish to be considered "rebels"; the rights rhetoric,
they thought, supported their claim of a right of revolution or a right
of secession. In fact, the idea of rights that Jefferson articulated does
not provide particularly persuasive authority for the kind of revolution
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that the colonists carried off. A right of secession and a people's right
of self-determination do not derive readily from Locke's theory of the
individual's inherent right to life and liberty. Mankind, to whose opinion
Jefferson paid decent respect, did not need Jefferson's theory of rights;
the many who supported the Revolution did not do so because they
were persuaded by that theory.
The idea of rights was not necessary to justify the American Rev-
olution; it was indispensable to American constitutional development.
The Framers' generation was committed to the notion of rights which
Jefferson had articulated in the Declaration (even though they continued
and even expanded slavery). After independence, they built their new
polities on that idea.
Three streams fed the Framers' ideology- English constitutional
history; European ideas, notably those of Locke and Montesquieu; and
their own experiences and ideas grown in the American soil.
English settlers brought with them the English Constitution, English
constitutional history, English institutions, and English law. Their her-
itage included resistance to arbitrary governmental power. Magna Carta,
the Petition of Right, the Glorious Revolution, and the English Bill of
Rights of 1688-89 marked movement toward parliamentary supremacy
in relation to the monarchy. In England, the social contract was between
the people's representatives in Parliament and the King, and rights under
that contract were inherited by English subjects. English subjects had
the right to be represented in Parliament and to be governed by law
enacted by Parliament. The colonists valued the rights they had as
English subjects and, indeed, insisted upon being accorded those rights,
for example, when they objected to "taxation without representation."
America built on this constitutional history. Beginning where the
Glorious Revolution had put England, the Americans gave to their
legislatures the principal powers of government. Neither the Crown nor
the royal governors had been a good advertisement for executive power,
and in America neither state governors nor the President came with a
legacy of entrenched royal prerogative. Consequently, both the states
and later the United States (like England but unlike France) avoided
serious constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative
branches. There was no such struggle when the American constitutions
were written, and there has been none since then.
The colonists, however, moved beyond their English heritage. The
experience of the American colonies under British rule persuaded them
that they needed protection for rights against the legislature as well as
against the executive. Out of the colonies' recent history came a sense
of "a plague on both your Branches" that led to a strong commitment
to separation of powers and to checks and balances even against the
legislature. The colonies found support for such checks and balances in
the idea of rights, not strictly Locke's, but their own version reflecting
1989] 1027
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
their own history and experience. America was "a new nation," and
in some sense had become a new nation while it was still a British
colony. The political character of the new nation resulted from English
charters that were adapted to the circumstances of the New World and
from American "charters" beginning with the Mayflower Compact.
Religious dissenters brought with them a conception of rights (including
rights of conscience) not rights granted by Parliament by law, but
natural, inherent rights. Invoking Otis and Paine,3 American colonial
publicists moved to the idea of social contract out of individual rights.
The Americans came to see rights not as concessions wrung from mon-
archs by nobles and by parliaments representing expanding land-owning
and merchant classes, but as inherent rights held by individuals prior
to government and law, and not given away but retained under gov-
ernment.
The revolution served to confirm these ideas about rights rather
than to give them any radical new turn. The move to independence, to
revolution "as of right," was blended with the idea of individual social
contract, a contract among individuals, and between the individual and
the government. The colonists had drafted bills of rights in that spirit-
not that of the English Bill of Rights with its rights of Parliament-
even before the Declaration of Independence. (Compare the declaration
and resolves of the First Continental Congress, in 1774; the address to
Inhabitants of Canada and a Declaration of the Causes and Necessity
of Taking up Arms, in 1775; and the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776. 4)
The Declaration of Independence confirmed and generalized what others
had said, and rendered their ideas unforgettable. In that Declaration
Jefferson penned these famous words:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just power from the
consent of the governed.
The commitment to individual rights in these lines is striking. Rights
are not conceded by or extracted from kings or enacted by Parliaments;
each individual is endowed with rights by the Creator. With life came
rights of liberty and autonomy. Liberty and autonomy enable individuals
to decide to enter a social contract and to institute government. The
purpose of government is to secure these rights.
3. James Otis' Speech Against the Writs of Assistance, from 2 The Works of John
Adams (C.F. Adams ed.), reprinted in H. Commager, 1 Documents of American History
45 (9th ed. 1973); T. Paine, The Rights of Man (1791/92).
4. See Commager, supra note 3, at 82, 91, 92, 103.
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Because of the early American preoccupation with rights, rights
guarantees became a condition of government for every state. Later, a
bill of rights became a condition for union, for approving the United
States Constitution, and rights became supreme constitutional law.
America's was not much of a revolution by world standards. There
was little to tear down, and no resistance by powerful domestic forces
or established institutions. Not much social or cultural change followed
from this revolution; that revolution was still to come. In fact, it was
probably the mildest revolution in history. It destroyed little, changed
little (cf. France, Russia)-for better and for worse. Some might say it
was a paper revolution, a conceptual revolution. But it inspired and
made possible a radical political, ideological revolution. The Revolution
cut the colonies' ties to the King, to Parliament, to the English Con-
stitution, and to English law as English law. The former colonists
repudiated the notion that their polity was based upon an inherited
social contract; their polity, they declared, was the creation of their
own new social contract based on their own natural rights. By their
own radical ideas, they transformed the institutions they had inherited.
They converted the rights which they had enjoyed as Englishmen into
universal principles. Not much else was needed for the Revolution to
be complete. Institutions and forms reflective of the colonists' unique
view of rights and government had already been conceived; many were
already in place.
Out of this ideological revolution emerged the United States' unique
brand of constitutionalism. It required a written constitution, which was
to serve as a new social contract. The new American social contract
was supreme law-supreme even to legislatures, to the people's political
representatives.
The radicalism of America's constitutionalism becomes apparent when
one compares the young United States with England, its mother in law.
The United States was committed to limited government. England's
government was limited only by the rule of law and established pro-
cedures. The Americans were committed to liberal government designed
for few and limited purposes; English constitutional history knew no
commitment to limitation in principle on the purposes of government.
The states of the United States were committed to the separation of
powers, articulated most clearly and dogmatically in Adams' Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780;1 in England, separation of powers was long
in flux as that country moved steadily toward parliamentary supremacy
and with that movement England was also abandoning checks and
balances. In America rights were natural, inherent, antecedent to gov-
5. Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in Commager, supra
note 3, at 110.
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ernment; in England, rights were derived from law, from the common
law and from Parliament, and even these rights that had been wrested
from the King in the Magna Carta and later charters were subject to
Parliament in principle. Perhaps the most radical idea of the American
Revolution was epitomized later in the first clause in the Bill of Rights:
"Congress shall make no law .... "
Building upon its radical views of constitutionalism and rights, the
United States has slowly established its unique constitutional system. A
critical part of this constitutional system today, a direct outgrowth of
the colonists' concern with rights, is the United States' rights-centered,
rights-ridden constitutional jurisprudence, explored below.
Rights and the French Revolution
The relationship between the French Revolution and the idea of
rights was quite different and led to a different story. At the time of
the Revolution the idea of rights was in the air in France, arising from
the writings of their own philosophers and publicists and of Locke and
Thomas Paine across the Channel. The United States Declaration of
Independence and the Bills of Rights of Virginia and Pennsylvania
confirmed for the French the importance of the idea of rights. France
adopted its Declaratior of Rights within two months of the fall of the
Bastille. Later the Revolution adopted a rights slogan, libert6, 6galit6,
fraternit6.
Slogans and even declarations, however, are often rhetorical, not
necessarily statements of commitment to political programs, not nec-
essarily constitutional dogma, not necessarily supreme law. The Decla-
ration of Rights and the theory it reflected declared universal principles
and were adopted by the National Assembly, perhaps even acquiesced
in by the King. The French Revolution itself, however, was independent
of the idea of individual rights. The Revolutionaries overthrew the ancien
r#gime, but did not do so pursuant to a new social contract accepted
by all.
Unlike the American Revolution, the French Revolution took place
in an ancient country with ancient institutions. In a radical sweep, the
Revolution replaced sovereignty in the king with sovereignty in the
Nation, but la nation was not a new conception and the Revolution
did not produce a new, different nation. The United States Declaration
was announced for a new nation in formation; the French Declaration
was announced for an old nation in transformation. Whereas the bills
of rights of the various American states had declared what the former
colonists had or would have with independence, the French Declaration
declared what the French people wanted, but what they did not have
and could not have without radical upheaval. In order for the ideas of
the Declaration to be.realized, old institutions had to be destroyed, or
at least significantly modified, and new institutions had to be created.
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Steps toward larger parliamentary power met fierce, powerful resistance
from the monarchy, nobility, and the church, institutions that were
supported by the courts. Political, social and economic tensions and the
clash of competing forces led to the Reign of Terror, to civil war, to
the Directorate, and then to Napoleon. In these struggles, individual
rights hardly mattered.
In a large sense, the French Revolution was not consummated, and
the idea of rights never realized, for more than 150 years. From 1793
until the middle of our century, France remained deeply divided in
ideology. Whereas England put her Glorious Revolution behind her and
built a national consensus on its fruits, whereas the United States looked
back at her Revolution with pride and satisfaction, France continued
to refight its Revolution.
To generations of "revolutionaries," the history of France dem-
onstrated the need for security against monarchy and the executive
establishment, and, following England, they sought such protection in
a powerful parliament. French constitutional history became a history
of struggle for power between the executive and the parliament, a struggle
that has continued into the present day. The influence of the United
States and its commitment to rights did not last. Perhaps because the
English were geographically and culturally nearer, their influence re-
mained stronger and longer. Liberal, republican spirits looked to West-
minster; in France, too, Cromwell prevailed.
During the first one hundred and fifty years following the French
Revolution, rights were not the battle cry even of its progressive de-
scendants. (Often rights were attacked from "the right" and from "the
left.") The Declaration of Rights was occasionally invoked in rhetoric,
but, after the short-lived Constitutions of 1791 and 1793, it was relegated
to a pantheon; it did not acquire a living place in the life of France
and it did not become law. Although the French Declaration of Rights
had influence around the world, it had little at home.
The French people left the development and care of rights to the
political process. In France, as in England, rights depended on law, on
parliament. France gradually moved toward democracy and toward the
promotion of rights, but for the French, rights were created and secured
through law; rights were not something that could be enforced against
the law. Those who wanted security against Parliament sought it in
Executive power, not, as in the United States, in the idea of rights
enforceable by the judiciary. To the French mind, courts were tainted
by their historical association with oppressive monarchs; an independent
judiciary was not foreseeable.
The Influence of Ideas
The divergence of the constitutional and "rights" histories of the
United States and France is due in large part to differences between
103119891
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the contexts of their revolutions and the place of rights in them. There
were differences also in the influence of ideas concerning the nature of
rights and government. Those ideas, and the choice among those ideas,
of course, were rooted in history, culture, and institutions.
Different intellectual traditions influenced France and the United
States. The Americans commonly fused democracy with individual rights,
but those ideas are different and may sometimes be in conflict. The
notion of "democracy" speaks to popular sovereignty, consent of the
governed, majority rule., and even utilitarianism, that is, the greatest
good of the greatest number. Individual rights sometimes do not fit well
within the scheme for democracy. Such rights operate as constraints
upon the government even when it acts for the good of the majority
or for the common good.
The French followed Rousseau. 6 They were concerned with equality
and community and with the general will, but not with rights; there
are no rights against the general will. The American followers of Locke
(more precisely, of Locke as modified by Jefferson) insisted on rights
first, even against the general (majority) will. France was concerned for
parliamentarism; the United States for constitutionalism. Leaders in the
United States spoke of "constitutional democracy," at bottom an ox-
ymoron. Later, the United States came to democracy, slowly, through
the idea of individual rights, and democracy remains subject to rights.
In France, as in England, the people had rights only by law, by the
grace of Parliament, the spokesman for the general will. The people
had no rights against Parliament, no right to challenge Parliamentary
supremacy.
Another difference between the United States and France lay-
perhaps-in their conceptions of the polity. In the United States, the
source of authority and of the legitimacy of government was "We the
People," which seems closer to notions of popular sovereignty and the
consent of the governed. Increasingly, the phrase came to mean "the
inhabitants," that is, particular living people; it did not necessarily
contradict the idea of individual rights. France, on the other hand, spoke
of La Nation. It was important that the nation replaced the crown as
the source of sovereignty. But La Nation is an abstraction that may
have stood above and distinct from individuals. (In some countries
emphasis on the nation suggested subordinating the individual to the
state, or even totalitarianism.)
From the beginning, there was also a difference between the rights
to which the two countries were committed. Lord Acton once said that
"[L]iberty was the watchword of the middle class, equality of the
6. See infra note 32.
1032 [Vol. 49
REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONS
lower." ' 7 The cry of liberty animated the American Revolution, by Ac-
ton's definition a bourgeois revolution for a bourgeois value. Although
Thomas Jefferson did declare a right of equality in the Declaration, the
United States was and remained a slave society. When the United States
Constitution was later drafted, the word "equal" was not in it. Lincoln
perhaps recognized this when he said that this nation had been "con-
ceived in liberty," but that equality-equal rights-was only a propo-
sition to which we were dedicated.8 The United States idea of rights
remained rooted in liberty (even before slavery was abolished). In fact,
liberty has often proved to be an obstacle to equality and fraternity in
the United States. The right of equality came very slowly in the United
States; even the liberty to discriminate was outlawed only recently.9 The
right to fraternity-as in social welfare-came even more slowly, largely
because of the Supreme Court's commitment to "liberty," to "freedom
of contract" in cases such as Lochner v. New York.'0
The French Revolution was more proletarian, more concerned for
equality. In time concern for equality led to democracy and to an activist
Parliament. Egalit also proved to be conducive to fraternitW; France
was an early welfare state. In France socialism became a vibrant ideology,
a form of utilitarianism to which liberty rights are sometimes subor-
dinated.
In sum, both the French Revolution and the American Revolution,
like many revolutions in more recent days, were conceived in rights, or
at least were justified by them. But the relation of rights to revolution
was different in France and the United States, and the fate of rights
in each country after its revolution was also, and perhaps for that
reason, different.
In the United States the idea of rights was pre-revolutionary, and
the use of rights in revolutionary rhetoric and ideology was incidental.
The fate of the rights ideology depended on the success of the Revolution
and on escape from the British constitution, but the lasting, long-term
life of the idea of rights in the new nation was hardly affected by the
Revolution. The idea of the social contract implicit in America's rights
ideology served the new nation well at the beginning, but had no further
use. There has been no reversion to revolution, to Jefferson. The Dec-
laration of Independence was not law, and even now, more than two
7. Acton, History of Freedom and Other Essays 88 (Figgis and Lawrence eds. 1916).
8. "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a
new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal." Gettysburg Address, Nov. 19, 1863.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a et seq.,
2000a et seq.; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct.
348 (1964).
10. 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
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hundred years later, the United States still has not fully realized its
promises-equality, retained rights, consent of all the governed.
In the United States the idea of rights was never in jeopardy.
American political culture was receptive to the idea. Freedom and the
minimal liberal state were conducive to enterprise and to economic
growth. Whereas democracy and representative government grew grad-
ually, rights were fundamental. The rights idea became entrenched and
domesticated, became "positivized," and remained as supreme law. Later,
judicial supremacy was confirmed as an integral part of America's rights
system and securing rights became the courts' principal constitutional
activity.
Developments in the mid-twentieth century served to change and to
extend America's rights landscape. Under the New Deal, the United
States became a welfare state, by grace of Congress, by Presidential
leadership, and by constitutional reinterpretation. Governmental power
therefore grew, but so did rights. These were not Jefferson's natural
rights, however, but perhaps the rights of a new social contract, one
based on a mutual commitment to human welfare. The post-War era
also brought other major rights developments, but they grew out of the
old, established, rights-tree. Today the United States is a constitutional
democracy, with majority rule by representative government, that is still
subject to individual rights; the United States is also a welfare state,
guaranteeing at least a minimum of social welfare entitlements.
The French experience with rights was different. In France, rights
slogans toppled the ancien regime, but destruction of the old regime
did not depend on rights. The post-revolutionary struggle in France was
not for rights, but for democracy; it was the struggle of Parliament
with the executive, in essence a parallel of earlier British constitutional
history. In France, rights became the responsibility of the political proc-
ess. Rights did not have constitutional sanction, and the inherent rights
of the Declaration became only "droits de crance," legislative entitle-
ments. In changing France, progressive forces did not seek individual
rights but pressed for increasing manifestations of the welfare state.
Only after the tragic history of World War II did France return to
its commitment to the notion of constitutional rights. When she did,
the Declaration was available, France's own Declaration, that is, purged
of traces of any American origins. At that time the International Human
Rights Movement may have had greater influence upon the French than
did the idea of rights embedded in the jurisprudence of the United
States. Not surprisingly, each country's rights commitment has played
out somewhat differently in the years since the War.
II. RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONS TODAY
Both the French and the American Revolutions led to written con-
stitutions. The French have had many. Although the first three French
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constitutions incorporated a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen, succeeding constitutions did not. Not until 1946, following
the ravages of the Second World War, did France again make the
Declaration part of its constitution. France's contemporary constitutional
regime, then, is now only some forty years old, but it has already
experienced significant growth, and the idea of constitutional rights seems
to have settled in.
The United States, by contrast, is constitutionally "ancient." The
United States has both the oldest written constitution and the oldest
constitutional bill of rights. In the United States, World War II did
not lead to the development of a new constitution or usher in radical
formal amendments to the existing constitution. But American consti-
tutional rights, too, one might say, has had its face lifted and given a
new look.
My purpose in this section is to explore the relationship between
the current status of rights in the United States and France and when,
and how, rights became constitutionalized in the two countries. I shall
suggest that the time and manner of the constitutionalization of rights
has shaped the contents of those rights as well as the means for im-
plementing them. I then muse lightly on what we might learn from the
"rights histories" of these two countries and what they might learn
from each other.
Both the United States and France have come to think of consti-
tutions as safeguards of rights, and "rights" are indeed mentioned in
almost all constitutions today. But if, as the French Declaration de-
clares,1" a society in which "rights are not guaranteed," has no con-
stitution, a society has a constitution only if its constitution imports
and secures "constitutionalism." Unfortunately, not all constitutions
import constitutionalism.
Today constitutionalism embraces several principles, among them:
popular sovereignty, consent of the governed, accountability of officials
to the people, the rule of law, the constitution as supreme law, gov-
ernment limited by some separation or diffusion of powers and by
checks and balances. Most importantly, constitutionalism implies respect
for individual rights and contemplates some means of assuring that
respect, for example, constitutional review by an independent judiciary.
Today both the United States and French constitutions import con-
stitutionalism. This has not always been so: until recently, the consti-
tutions of the two countries did not show commitment to constitutionalism,
equally and in full measure.
11. French Declaration, art. 16, supra text accompanying note 1.
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Constitutions and Rights: The United States
The United Stated adopted a constitution and embraced constitu-
tionalism early in its history. Interesting to note, constitutionalism is
not plainly reflected on the face of that constitution. Unlike most
countries, which have have elegant constitutions but are defective in
constitutionalism, the United States has a sturdy constitutionalism but
a defective constitution.
The United States Constitution does imply popular sovereignty, in
that it is ordained by "We the people." It declares itself to be supreme
law. It reflects some notion of separation of powers and of checks and
balances. But none of these elements was clearly expressed or fully
developed in the original document. What is more, the original consti-
tution was virtually silent about individual rights. When the Constitution
came into effect two hundred years ago, the word "rights" was not in
it. Some provisions did guarantee certain rights, for example, the right
to jury trial. These isolated provisions, however, did not reflect a clear
theory of rights or add up to a comprehensive catalogue of rights. The
most important rights by any theory or standard were not mentioned
at all: "liberty" is mentioned only in the preamble, and then only as
an aim of union, not as a right. "Equality" is not mentioned at all.
Several important dispositions, moreover, are inconsistent with basic
rights. For example, the Constitution accepted the institution of slavery,
mandated that a slave should be counted as three-fifths of a person,
and prohibited placing restrictions on the importation of additional
slaves, at least for the first twenty years of the new republic.' 2
The Constitution's failure to mention rights and its silence on liberty
and equality are particularly striking since America's national birth cer-
tificate, the Declaration of Independence, declared that the purpose of
government is to secure rights and highlighted equality and liberty.
Scholars have long pondered why the Framers failed to include
guarantees of individual rights and other elements of constitutionalism
in the United States Constitution. Some have explained that failure by
stressing differences between a declaration of independence and a con-
stitution, between a manifesto with its promises and aspirations and a
blueprint struggling with the "nitty-gritty" and sober business of daily
governance. Others have stressed the changed mood, between elated
resistance at Lexington-Concord and reactions to Shays's rebellion, as
well as the different cast of characters at the second Philadelphia Con-
vention.
I have offered a simpler explanation: The Constitution is not the
direct descendant of the Declaration, but is at best only a collateral
heir. Independence brought two separate developments. The thirteen
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, c. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
1036 [Vol. 49
REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONS
former colonies became independent states, drafted new state constitu-
tions and established new state governments, and they did so in the
spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the political ideology it
articulated. Several constitutions contained a full Bill of Rights. At the
same time the newly independent states moved to form a union. In
1781 they adopted the Articles of Confederation.
The state constitutions were direct descendants of the Declaration
of Independence and reflected its basic principles; the United States
Constitution descended from the Articles of Confederation. Like the
Articles before it, the Constitution was concerned not with governance,
but with union. The purpose of the second convention in Philadelphia,
later called the Constitutional Convention, was to amend the Articles
in order to create a "more perfect union." The delegates to the con-
vention went beyond their mandate and created a government instead
of an improved confederation. But this new government was designed
to be only a small superstructure over the various state governments,
and was given only as much governing power as was required for union.
The state governments remained intact and retained primary responsibility
for governance. Relations between individuals and government, a re-
sponsibility that implicates rights, was left principally to the state gov-
ernments under their constitutions.
The primary emphasis in the United States Constitution, then, was
not on governance, but on union. For this reason, the Constitution did
not articulate a theory of government. It did not contain a Bill of
Rights or articulate a commitment to rights. Most of the Framers did
not believe it necessary to establish rights against a government of such
limited powers. Rights had to be protected only against state govern-
ments, which enjoyed plenary governmental power, and that protection
was provided by the state constitutions. Therefore, the United States
Constitution set out only the handful of rights that required protection
against the new small government of the United States, principally those
that might be implicated by federal criminal law: the right to a writ of
habeas corpus, and to trial by jury in the courts of the new government,
and freedom from ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. The Con-
stitution also set out a few rights against the states-those implicated
in a more perfect union of republican states (for example, the prohibition
of titles of nobility, the rights of citizens of one state in the territory
of another state), and those where one state's violation of rights might
be of particular concern to other states (for example, the prohibitions
on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the impairment of con-
tracts). '3
13. Perhaps the failure to include a Bill of Rights reflects also a tendency of the
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Despite the efforts of the Framers to fashion a new central gov-
ernment of strictly limited powers, many opposed adoption of the Con-
stitution because it did not contain a bill of rights. They were promised
that a bill of rights would be added to the Constitution by amendment.
In 1789 Congress adopted ten amendments which later came to be known
as "the Bill of Rights." It consisted of a string of individual amendments.
They were not incorporated into the structure and fabric of the Con-
stitution. They contained no theory or justification for rights (like that
found in the Declaration). They indicated no institutions or remedies
for securing respect for those rights.
The Bill of Rights was seriously defective, even by the Framers'
lights. The guarantees provided fell far short of the promises and com-
mitments of the Declaration. Slavery was left intact. The right to equal
protection of the laws is not there. Life, liberty and property were
protected against deprivation "without due process of law," that is
against lawlessness, but not against law; in other words, against executive
and judicial action, but not against arbitrary legislative action. The Bill
of Rights did not assure the consent of the governed by providing for
the right to vote. The Ninth Amendment provides that rights not enu-
merated are also retained by the people, but no one has claimed that
the Amendment fills the lacunae I have noted. In any event, whatever
the unmentioned rights which the Framers of that Amendment had in
mind, the Amendment serves not to "disparage or deny them," but has
not given those rights constitutional protection. Moreover, even as re-
gards the enumerated rights, the Amendments fail to obligate the gov-
ernment, or even to empower that government, to secure those rights
against invasion by public authority or by private persons. In sum, the
constitutionalization of rights accomplished by the Bill of Rights guar-
anteed only a limited number of the rights promised by the Declaration
of Independence and failed to assure protection for even the rights that
were enumerated. Needless to say, the Bill of Rights did not address
at all the welfare rights that have been recognized in the twentieth
century.
During the two hundred years since the Bill of Rights was adopted
the United States has been transformed. The central government has
become a full and powerful government, overshadowing those of the
Framers to underemphasize the radical elements of their Constitution. I have suggested
elsewhere that the Framers seemed disposed not to emphasize the change from the Articles
to a constitution, from a confederation to a government. Hence they retained the name
"the United States," called the legislature "the Congress," (as it was under the Articles),
gave the new executive the title of "President." See Henkin, Constitutional Fathers-
Constitutional Sons, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 1113, 1125-26 n.37. Perhaps the Framers were
also disposed against including a Bill of Rights so as not to highlight the fact that they
had created a new government, and one that might prove to be a powerful government.
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states. But the United States has not adopted a new constitution nor
has the existing Constitution been amended to reflect those transfor-
mations. Some of the deficiencies of the Bill of Rights have been cured
by amendment; most have not been. Slavery was abolished but, for the
rest, the only major rights amendment to the Constitution, the Fourteenth
Amendment, was essentially addressed to the states and nationalized
protection for rights against the states; the Bill of Rights, limiting the
federal government, has remained untouched by amendment. Even after
the Civil War and the end of slavery, no provision guaranteeing the
equal treatment of citizens was added to the Bill of Rights. To this
day, nothing on the face of the Constitution forbids the central gov-
ernment from discriminating against persons on account of race, religion,
or gender. Later constitutional amendments prohibit the United States
(and the states) to deny suffrage on account of race or gender, but an
affirmative grant of the right to vote and a general commitment to
democracy have never been explicitly incorporated into the Constitution. 14
In part, perhaps, because of its defects, the Bill of Rights did not
figure prominently in constitutional jurisprudence during the larger part
of American history. The Framers had thought that the Bill of Rights
was unnecessary, and for the first one hundred and fifty years under
the new Constitution the Framers' views seemed to hold true: Congress
exercised few powers that implicated individual rights. The Alien and
Sedition Laws raised issues under the First Amendment but those laws
were short-lived and were never reviewed by the Supreme Court. 5 Only
one case implicating the Bill of Rights reached the Supreme Court before
the Civil War, namely, Dred Scott, 6 and very few cases under the Bill
of Rights reached the Court during the seventy years immediately fol-
lowing that war.
During those seventy years, too, the federal courts construed the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Bill of Rights narrowly. They
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states.' They effectively eviscerated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and reduced equal protection by embracing the "sep-
arate but equal" doctrine; they enlarged the scope of protection under
the due process clause by developing "substantive due process," but
14. U.S. Const. amend. XV (1870); U.S. Const. amend. XIX (1920).
15. See generally J.M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1956).
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
17. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937). Incorporation of the First Amendment
came early (Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 25 (1925); see Palko v.
Connecticut). Most other provisions were incorporated by 1968 (Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968)).
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used it principally to protect so-called "liberty of contract,"' 8 to frustrate
social legislation and hold back the emergence of the United States as
a welfare state for decades. Neither the First Amendment nor the Four-
teenth Amendment afforded much protection to freedom of expression
in the years following World War 1.19 The courts reduced Congressional
power to safeguard rights by applying the "state action" requirement
broadly and interpreting the enabling clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment narrowly. 0
Not until the advent of the New Deal did the United States experience
significant new developments in its conception of rights. Even then,
despite national economic crisis, developments did not come easily.
Welfare rights, which had come to France early and grown steadily,
came in the United States with great difficulty. The courts found con-
stitutional obstacles in principles of federalism, in "liberty of contract. "21
A constitutional amendment was required to support a progressive in-
come tax on which the welfare state depends. Slowly, some rights were
added by statute after the Supreme Court finally recognized broad powers
of Congress under the enabling clauses of the Civil War Amendments,
the Commerce Clause, and the Taxing and Spending powers. 2  At the
same time, the Supreme Court began to strengthen procedural due
process guarantees and provide some protections for freedom of ex-
pression.2" It began to take a sharper look at the "separate but equal"
doctrine and to scrutinize "suspect classifications ' 24 and invasion of
important rights such as freedom of religion and expression.
The United States in the Age of Rights
A marked advance for human rights came with the Second World
War, which ushered in what might well be called "the Age of Rights";
United States rights ideas had significant influence on those develop-
18. In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896); Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
19. For the history of the development of free speech in the United States, see Z.
Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941).
20. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883).
21. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918); Lochner, 198 U.S.
45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
22. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
23. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914) (right not to have
evidence obtained by illegal search or seizure used against defendant in federal criminal
trials); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932) (in some cases right to
counsel essential to due process).
24. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944).
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ments. President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms ' 25 became a watchword
for the Allied war effort and for the international human rights move-
ment that accompanied allied victory. The idea of rights was reflected
in the UN Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, de-
veloped under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt with the collaboration
of Ren6 Cassin of France (and others), bears strong traces of the
eighteenth century rights ideas of France and the United States and of
intervening developments in regard to rights in both countries. The
international human rights movement was infused also by other ideas,
notably the spreading commitment to society's responsibility for indi-
vidual social and economic welfare, and to the principle of self-deter-
mination.
Influence may take different forms and is difficult to trace; often
it is reciprocal. If United States ideas influenced the growth of inter-
national human rights, the United States in turn was not immune to
the implications of the international human rights movement. That move-
ment, and domestic changes resulting from the War, helped reshape the
conception of rights in the United States.
Rights in the United States felt the impact of Hitler and the War
only indirectly. The war experience highlighted the need to address racial
discrimination in the United States, but, in general, the United States
emerged from the War with the impression that its constitutionalism
was healthy, beyond need for change, and immune from external in-
fluence. But the international responsibilities thrust upon the United
States after the War, as well as new developments in global commu-
nication and intercourse, made the United States susceptible to influence
from abroad in fact. This influence, I believe, helped change the face
of rights in the United States in the post-War era. By a process that
might be described as judicial genetic engineering, the Supreme Court
"corrected" most of the congenital defects in the United States Con-
stitution, and constitutionalism in the United States was developed if
25. Annual Message to the Congress, Jan. 6, 1941, in Development of United States
Foreign Policy: Addresses and Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt 86-87 (1942).
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon four essential human freedoms.
The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way-
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want-which, translated into world terms, means
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime
life for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear-which, translated into world terms, means
a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough
fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor-anywhere in the world.
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not transformed. The Court enhanced personal liberty, made strides
toward establishing equality, improved our democracy, and confirmed
the broad powers of Congress to promote fraternity.
Since World War II the United States has seen a dramatic trans-
formation in the character, content, and scope of rights. Rights became
not only the rights of gentlemen but the rights of all. To the established
commitment to political rights, was added concern for individual au-
tonomy, dignity, self-realization, and privacy. The court expanded the
protections of the Bill of Rights in the criminal process and made
virtually all of those provisions applicable to the states by "incorpo-
ration" in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution was reinter-
preted to transform the United States commitment to equality. In Brown
v. Board of Education,26 the Supreme Court abandoned "separate but
equal." Other classifications based upon race were declared suspect, to
be sharply scrutinized. Some stereotypes as to the relevance of gender
were discarded and distinction based upon gender became nearly sus-
pect. 27 The Supreme Court filled a major gap in the Bill of Rights when
it concluded that equal protection of the laws, required by the states
of the Fourteenth Amendment, was required also of the federal gov-
ernment by the due process clause in the Bill of Rights. From the idea
of equality the Supreme Court developed a requirement of "one person,
one vote" and effectively universal suffrage.
The new rights mood in the United States took hold of Congress.
Unleashed by the Court, invoking the Commerce Power and other
enlarged powers, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act and the Voting
Rights Act, legislated to prohibit private discrimination, promote freedom
of information and protect the environment. Through programs such
as the Great Society, Congress recognized new economic-social rights
and various entitlements for minorities, the elderly, and the poor.
The explosion of rights in the United States might not have been
possible without the coming of age of judicial review. John Marshall
had asserted that power early but it was not confirmed and established
and judicial supremacy and finality were not secured until this century.
Once, its principal constitutional function was to assure the proper
division of authority between the central and state governments and the
allocation of powers among the branches of the United States govern-
ment. Now, the principal use of judicial review is for monitoring respect
for rights, by the states and by the United States government, by the
executive as by legislatures.
The courts have not always been the bulwark of rights. In Dred
Scott, the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy v. Ferguson, Korematsu, the post-
26. 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955).
27. See for example Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
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war "sedition" cases, and others, the Supreme Court did not champion
individual rights.28 Throughout much of its history the Court has fol-
lowed a policy of judicial reticence and restraint and had developed an
entire jurisprudence for not addressing constitutional issues. The courts,
moreover, are only responsive and the security of rights depends initially
and perhaps ultimately on political institutions and on the people's
commitment to a rights culture. Nevertheless, in all, today most Amer-
icans would agree with Chief Justice Hughes that "the judiciary is the
safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution. '29
Constitutional rights are alive and quite well in the United States
today. Constitutionally recognized rights have expanded greatly since
1789, and some now think the United States is "rights-ridden." Yet
our contemporary jurisprudence of constitutional rights, one might say,
still suffers from the genetic defects of its textual source, the Bill of
Rights. That text, which remains our holy writ and continues to frame
judicial thinking about rights, has not been changed since it was added
to the Constitution. Consequently, the Constitution still contains no
statement of the theory underlying or the justification of rights. Despite
the Ninth Amendment, rights other than those enumerated in the original
Bill of Rights still have no explicit constitutional protection. Basic civil
rights and the national commitment of more than a half a century to
Freedom from Want 30 have not been constitutionalized. The Constitution
still does not require or even empower the government to insure respect
for rights even by its own officials, surely not by private actors. Many
advances in rights still have no firm basis in constitutional text. Textually,
life, liberty, and property remain unprotected against deprivations by
arbitrary law; textually, there still is nothing in the Constitution to
forbid the federal government from engaging in discrimination based
upon race, religion, or gender; textually there still is no right to vote.
Finally, the Constitution continues to lack a clear textual basis for
judicial review and for the role of the courts as the guardian of rights.
In short, despite the transformations in American society in the last
two hundred years, and despite the rights explosion of the Age of
Rights, a development that brought with it the recognition of important
social welfare rights, the United States still faces the world with a
Constitution that reflects and is limited by an eighteenth century idea
28. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.
Ct. 18 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896); Korematsu, 323
U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857
(1951).
29. Speech at Elmira, May 3, 1907, in Charles E. Hughes, Addresses 139-41 (1908),
quoted in The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes 144 (Danelski & Tulchin
eds. 1973).
30. See supra note 25.
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of inherent rights and of the liberal state. To the extent that the explosion
of rights has come about through the reinterpretation of this ancient
text, it remains intellectually vulnerable and at the mercy of changing
judicial ideology. To the extent that the explosion has come through
legislation, it remains politically and perhaps also constitutionally vul-
nerable and at the mercy of political ideology and societal change.
Constitutions and Rights: France
Prior to World War II, France did not enjoy constitutional rights
in significant degree. Although the French Declaration of Rights had
inspired the world, it was only a brooding presence in France, and
sometimes the object of scorn. Through empires, monarchies, and re-
publics, France struggled towards representative democracy. Following
Rousseau rather than Locke, Westminster rather than Washington, France
sought protection against executive abuses in a strong parliament and
in the supremacy of law. In France, law defined and protected rights.
France had and sought no protection against parliament, neither in the
courts nor by an independent press. To the contrary, the press sought
protection in law, in parliament.
In pre-World War II France, there was little tension between rights
and law; rights were achieved and guaranteed through the law. Inherent
rights, recognized by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, were not constitutional and were not law. In its civil law tradition
rights could not be "inherent," pre-political; all law was positive law,
all rights were droits de crtance, rights ordained by law.
Non-inherent, non-constitutional rights were not supreme but they
had some advantages over the United States Bill of Rights system. In
France, rights were not limited by an original conception of natural,
pre-societal, rights: rights could be civil as well as political, positive as
well as negative, rights of fraternit as well as liberty rights. France was
not limited by a "state action" requirement: the law could guarantee
rights not only against the government (the executive), but also against
private actors. Rights-through-law developed not only the limitations on
but also the affirmative obligations of political society. France outlawed
slavery in 1794 (in the midst of the Terror) and the constitution of 1795
also prohibited slavery. The 1830 constitution abolished censorship and
the 1848 French constitution expressly prohibited slavery and press cen-
sorship and limited the death penalty.' It not only guaranteed the
freedom to work, but it also assumed the political obligation to prepare
individuals for work and to help them obtain it. With increasing in-
31. Decree upon Slavery, Feb. 4, 1794; French Constitution of 1795, Rights art. 15;
French Constitution of 1830, art. 7; French Constitution of 1848, chap. II, art. 5 (death
penalty), art. 6 (slavery), art. 8 (censorship).
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dustrialization, French law addressed the problems of inhuman labor
conditions. Building upon rights of equality and fraternity, French law
began to guarantee various economic and social entitlements. France
was a welfare state "avant la lettre." Rights through law also provided
for the enforcement of rights, notably through the Conseil d'etat, which
over time developed a jurisprudence that protected individuals against
abuses by the executive branch of the government. But Parliament was
supreme, law was supreme. The "general will" could not be wrong,
could not violate rights.32
Then, with the tragic events of 1940, public confidence in Parliament,
in the "general will," was shaken. Early defeat, German occupation,
and the sad story of Vichy, brought home the need for protection
against the political process, against corruption of the general will, even
against Parliament itself.
France in the Age of Rights
After the end of the War in 1945, France began to rebuild its society
and its government. France's war experience had largely destroyed old
resistance to republican democracy. The war in general, and Vichy rule
in particular, also brought a renaissance of the idea of constitutional
rights.
France adopted a new constitution in 1946. In the Preamble, the
French people "solemnly reaffirms the rights and freedom of man and
of the citizen consecrated by the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the
fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic." The
Preamble also proclaimed as "most vital in our time," a number of
"political, economic and social principles," including equal rights for
women, and rights of labor, health care, and education.
The 1946 Constitution was replaced by that of 1958, but the French
commitment to rights remained primary. The Preamble of the new
constitution begins "[The French people hereby solemnly proclaims its
attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sov-
ereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, reaffirmed and com-
plemented by the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946." In addition,
the new constitution specified a series of rights including what appears
to be a commitment to establish the writ of habeas corpus (which had
been unknown in France)."
32. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man adopted Rousseau's concept of
the general will: "The law is the expression of the general will" (art. 6). See generally
J. Rivero,. Les Libert~s Publiques (1974); J. Morange, Libert6s Publiques (1985).
33. French Const. of 1958, art. 66. Whether this commitment has been realized is
still debated.
1989] 1045
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The 1946 Preamble incorporates the Declaration and the "funda-
mental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic"; the 1958
Constitution incorporates the Preamble of 1946. Scholars have struggled
to comprehend the sum of those incorporations and their import for
constitutional rights in France. Some have pointed out that "solemnly
reaffirms," and even "solemnly proclaims its attachment to," seem
precatory rather than prescriptive, more manifesto than law. The re-
ferences to the Declaration leave uncertain whether they reaffirm the
theory and rhetoric of the Declaration, including its commitment to the
"natural, inalienable, sacred rights of man," as well as its detailed
provisions, and whether the constitutional framers intended that the
provisions of the Declaration be interpreted and applied as legal pres-
criptions. The "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the
Republic," incorporated into the new constitution along with the Dec-
laration, are neither identified nor defined. But an activist, imaginative,
Conseil d'etat has combined those "incorporations" into constitutional
rights for the purpose of monitoring the French bureaucracy. And an
active, imaginative Conseil constitutionnel has begun to articulate its
own theory of constitutional rights in monitoring bills of the French
Parliament that are about to become law. 34
The Declaration, modernized and extended by the "fundamental
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic," has become a con-
stitutional Bill of Rights, but the scope and content of constitutional
rights in France remain to be defined and developed. It may be that,
whether as "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Re-
public," or as "political, economic and social principles" "most vital
in our time," France has constitutionalized not only the natural rights
of the Declaration, that is, civil and political rights, but also economic
and social rights, formerly only droits de crance. If so, as Professor
Rivero has put it, "[h]uman rights lost in theoretical purity what they
gained in scope." Such an enlarged conception of constitutional rights
doubtless creates intellectual as well as political tensions: On the one
hand, state power must be limited in order to preserve individual free-
dom; on the other, the state must have power to provide for the security
and welfare of its citizens. Freedom and material security are diverging
aspirations that perhaps balance each other, and their proper synthesis
may be essential for "human dignity.""
Perhaps the most radical development in French constitutional ju-
risprudence has been the advent of constitutional review. That American
34. See generally J. Rivero, Le Conseil constitutionnel et les libert6s (2d ed. 1987).
35. J. Rivero, The French Conception of Human Rights, in L. Henkin & J. Rivero,
Human Rights: France and the United States of America 3 (May 1984) (available from
the Columbia Center for the Study of Human Rights).
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contribution to constitutional rights has become almost irresistible in-
ternationally, even in the Soviet Union; France has not been immune
from that influence. French scholars rightly stress the differences between
French constitutional review and that of the United States, but the idea
of an independent constitutional monitor designed to make the Consti-
tution the supreme law is clearly, and admittedly, an American inspi-
ration.
Constitutional review in France today is probably not what the
framers of the French Constitution contemplated. Principally, it appears,
the French organ of constitutional review, the Conseil constitutionnel,
was designed to monitor the principles of "separation of powers" es-
tablished by the 1958 Constitution so as to protect the Executive against
usurpation by Parliament. In the age of rights, however, the Conseil
moved to become a rights tribunal. The influence upon the Conseil of
the example of the United States Supreme Court, of that court's activism,
and of the United States' rights jurisprudence cannot be proven but
need not be dismissed as insubstantial.
French constitutional review is unique. The Conseil is not a court,
and not all of its members are lawyers. The Conseil is not outside the
political process; it injects constitutional correctives into the political
process. The Conseil does not frustrate the general will: "the law voted
... does not express the general will unless it is in conformity with
the Constitution. ' 3 6 The Conseil does not review a law after it is enacted
in response to individual complaint and in the context of a particular
case or controversy; the Conseil, usually at the behest of opposition
members of parliament,3 7 passes upon the constitutionality of proposed
legislation before it becomes law; the Conseil is part of the legislative
process. Parliament is constitutionally prohibited from completing the
enactment of a law that in the Conseil's opinion would be unconsti-
tutional.
Constitutional rights in France are still young and developing. The
Conseil is basing its constitutional jurisprudence upon an old text which
was only recently resuscitated and which will require new interpretations.
The Conseil may look to the "original intent" of the old text, or it
may interpret it as a "living constitution." Joining the Declaration to
"fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic" and
to "political, economic and social principles" "vital in our time" surely
projects a constitutional jurisprudence of uncertainty and promise.
Constitutional rights in France will doubtless continue to reflect the
French tradition of rights-through-law. That tradition was significantly
36. Con. Const. D.C. 85-197 (August 23, 1985).
37. By constitutional amendment in 1974, the right to refer legislation to the Conseil
was extended to any sixty members of either house of parliament. See generally Beardsley,
Constitutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 189 (1975).
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reaffirmed by the Preamble's incorporation of "the fundamental prin-
ciples recognized by the laws of the Republic." Parliament, as it did
prior to World War II, continues to define and to regulate liberties.
For example, French law recognizes the right to a free press, but that
law also provides for significant state involvement in the nation's com-
munications media. France's inquisitorial system of criminal justice in-
volves the government in insuring enjoyment of rights in ways that the
United States would not find acceptable. The courts are independent,
but their independence is guaranteed by the President. The courts are
not supreme but are bound by law.38
The tradition of rights-through-law has strengths but also deficien-
cies, not least the form of constitutional review that it has generated.
Although foreign to the American tradition, constitutional review as
part of the legislative process, prior to the enactment of legislation and
at the behest of political opposition in Parliament, is an interesting
variation, but the unavailability of review at the initiative of individual
citizens is surely a handicap. Of even greater concern is the fact that
the Conseil cannot scrutinize and invalidate laws that have already been
enacted; pqsitive law is supreme law, and law that is already on the
books, whether old or new, is invulnerable to constitutional scrutiny.
Even if the Conseil succeeds in frustrating a bill that resembles or affects
enacted legislation, the constitutional efficacy of existing legislation is
not called into question.
Another potential threat to the tradition of constitutional rights in
France is the emergency power granted to the President under the 1958
Constitution.39 The scope of this power still remains to be determined.
The President is authorized to take "the measures required by the
circumstances," including presumably the suspension of rights. Given
the nature of the Conseil's power of review, that body would not be
able to review the constitutionality of the President's action (though it
might address that action in reviewing some responsive measures by
Parliament). There are no signs that the emergency power in France
might again be used, or might ever be abused, but its inclusion in the
Constitution cannot be reassuring, in a world in which the governments
of innumerable countries have used such powers to undermine or cir-
cumvent even the most elaborate systems for the protection of human
rights. The United States has reason to take pride in the fact that its
Constitution grants neither the legislative nor the executive branch an
emergency power, that there is no power to suspend the Constitution
or any constitutional rights, or the Congress, or the courts. The only
right that may be suspended, according to the United States Constitution,
38. French Const. arts. 64, 65.
39. Id. art. 16.
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is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and only in carefully
limited and defined circumstances, and only by act of Congress.
Rights in the United States and France: Rapprochement
The idea of rights is now alive and well in both the United States
and France. Ideas common to the Declaration of Independence and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man are now reflected in the
constitutional texts, the jurisprudence, and the politics of both nations.
In both nations, the nature; scope, and content of rights have changed.
The United States conception of rights is no longer strictly that of Locke
and Jefferson: natural rights are now framed in and limited or shaped
by the constitutional text. France no longer stands firmly with Rousseau:
the general will now speaks through the Constitution even louder than
through parliamentary majorities, and the common good represented by
the general will now includes respect for individual rights as provided
in the Constitution. In the United States, though the courts have given
no effect to the Ninth Amendment and recognize only rights included
in positive constitutional law, they have effectively read some inherent
rights into the constitutional text, for example, when they invoke "sub-
stantive due process" to recognize and protect rights of autonomy and
of privacy. For its part, the French Conseil might yet conclude that the
constitutional Preamble incorporated not only the Declaration's specific
provisions but also its underlying natural rights theory, or might find
inherent rights in the "fundamental principles" of the laws of the
Republic, and the "political, economic and social principles" "most
vital in our time." Like France, the United States increasingly relies on
droits de crkance, rights established or guaranteed by civil rights laws
and welfare legislation, federal and state.
The content of the rights recognized in the two countries is also
similar in broad outline. In both countries, the right to liberty and the
right to property are respected. Both countries are committed to equality
before the law, but in principle only the equality cited by Anatole
France;40 neither country recognizes a constitutional obligation to elim-
inate, offset or compensate for inequalities between individuals or to
equalize wealth or other advantages. Both countries now recognize and
realize welfare rights: in France such rights are constitutional, while in
the United States they are only legislative entitlements. Both countries
have developed institutions to secure rights against encroachment, but
in France there is as yet no security against legislation already enacted.
40. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." A. France, Le Lys Rouge, chap.
7 (1894).
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Important differences between the two countries remain, the result
of different constitutional texts, different histories, different cultures.
The French Constitution reaffirms rights by incorporating an eighteenth
century text, but the result may be significantly more modern. The
French Declaration makes explicit rights which American courts inferred
from or read into the Bill of Rights much later, for example, the
presumption of innocence in criminal trials, the right to equal protection
of the laws, voting rights. And since it was incorporated in a constitution
in 1946, the text can perhaps be read as a contemporary text, interpreted
in the light of the contemporary intent of the contemporary framers of
the 1946 Constitution.
In the United States, the origins of rights as pre-constitutional con-
tinue to shape constitutional jurisprudence. Constitutional rights are still
essentially negative rights, freedom from government. There is no con-
stitutional obligation, surely no legally enforceable obligation, on any
branch or level of government to act to protect individual rights or even
to guarantee individual security. Affirmative rights, including the social
welfare rights of the twentieth century, remain outside the scope of
constitutional protection, are contingent upon the political process, on
legislatures not on the courts. Therefore, they ebb and flow according
to the prevailing political ideology, the varying political power of com-
peting claimants, they depend on competition for resources, on willing-
ness to tax and be taxed.
In the United States, however, rights are guaranteed not only by
the national government but also by the governments of the various
states. The states are subject to large Congressional control, and to
judicial scrutiny, both in their own courts and in those of the United
States. State constitutions, however, are more fluid and up-to-date than
the United States Constitution. Throughout their histories, the states
have struggled continually to distribute responsibility for rights between
their constitutions and the political process, between their citizens (as
by the use of the referendum) and the legislature, and between the
legislature and the courts. All states have long had a commitment to a
right to public education, and some have recently begun to recognize
other social welfare entitlements as constitutional rights.
Because France has accorded constitutional status to affirmative
economic and social rights as well as to negative political and civil rights,
the range of constitutional rights recognized in France is now broader
than that recognized in the United States. The French Parliament, more
than the United States Congress, remains actively involved in defining
and regulating rights. In France, more of the decisions regarding the
proper balance between rights and public order are made by Parliament,
few by the Conseil, none by the courts.
The stark differences between the American and French mechanisms
for constitutional review reflect even more important differences in po-
litical and legal philosophy. The United States system of judicial review
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makes the courts the supreme and ultimate arbiters of constitutional
rights, subject only to constitutional requirements of "case or contro-
versy" and the judges' own sense of institutional prudence. In fact, the
political and constitutional culture of the United States has largely
"internalized" the Constitution, and few acts of Congress are now
invalidated. But the judicial guillotine stands waiting in the wings.
In France, by contrast, even the post-War constitutions have reflected
the historic ambivalence toward constitutional rights and particularly
toward their enforcement. The Declaration of Rights has come into its
own, and with other "fundamental principles" serves as a guide to
Parliament and the agencies of government, but its enforcement is subject
to severe limitations. Rights are enforced against the bureaucracy by
the Conseil d'etat, but the enforcement of rights through constitutional
review by the Conseil constitutionnel remains confined within the leg-
islative process. The Conseil has no power to respond to individual
complaint. It can do nothing to protect individuals against existing law.
The Conseil's power of constitutional review is limited by the political
process and by the political prudence of the members of that court.
French constitutional review still remains to be tested, and its place in
French constitutional culture may not yet be secure. Unlike the Supreme
Court of the United States, the Conseil, it appears, has yet to acquire
the national acceptance and reverence that would help it to withstand
political buffeting. The place of the Conseil in the constitutional hier-
archy and in constitutional philosophy is still to be worked out and
fought out. In any event, as presently conceived, the Conseil will not
be "supreme" as the United States Supreme Court is supreme.
A nation's attitude toward rights varies with its attitude toward
democracy. Different histories gave the two countries different percep-
tions on rights, democracy, and the relation between them. France came
into the post-War period without a living tradition of constitutional
rights, but with a living tradition-rudely interrupted-of political rights
and of rights-through-law. Rights were realized through democracy; free-
dom was by law, not from law. Rights were granted and protected by
a democratic parliament, and even today Parliament continues to be
the principal source and basis of rights in France. Law was not a
limitation on freedom but the articulation and safeguard of freedom.
In the United States, rights came first, government later; rights came
first, democracy came later. Democracy came through the idea of rights,
and rights limited democracy: "Congress shall make no law." Those
committed to liberty continued to view law as a potential threat, perhaps
because suffrage was limited, the nation's lawmaking bodies, both federal
and state, were not democratic, and because majorities could not be
trusted to respect minorities. Even after the attainment of universal
suffrage, Americans have continued to regard rights as a necessary
limitation upon law.
19891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Between the systems of constitutional rights in the two countries
there are also differences in detail, differences based more upon tradition
than philosophical principle. The United States is more "liberal," more
tolerant of free speech and press. France, for example, is less allergic
to "prior restraint." It has no Sullivan4 principle to protect critics of
government officials. (The United States is even more tolerant than
France of sexually explicit material!) In some respects the United States
is more strict in monitoring the relationship between church and state.
For example, the United States, unlike France, generally prohibits fi-
nancial support for religious schools. 42 On the other hand, the French
do not open their national assembly with a prayer and do not require
witnesses to take an oath on the Bible. France gives more play to
"affirmative action" than the United States Supreme Court presently
seems inclined to tolerate. 43 In the criminal process there are significant
differences regarding the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination,
of the right to counsel, and the use of unlawfully obtained evidence.
Several years ago I summed up the relationship between the two
traditions as follows:
France and the United States represent two strands in a
single eighteenth century conception of rights. They have much
in common, and some important differences. In both, individual
rights are part of a comprehensive theory of government. It
includes representative government, with separated branches. It
includes as well inherent individual rights, as ends in themselves,
not merely as instrumental to some overriding conception of the
good society. Important rights cannot be wholly sacrificed even
for the general, public good. Rights include liberty, equality,
property, and substantial freedom of enterprise.
In the United States rights are essentially freedoms-includ-
ing freedom from the people's representatives in government,
freedom even from the law if it is excessive. In respect of
freedom, it is the individual against the society, in adversary
relationship. One depoliticized public institution-the courts-
has become sufficiently independent of the rest of the govern-
ment to serve as the bulwark of the individual's rights. Other
extra-governmental, antigovernmental institutions help safeguard
rights-e.g., the press. Other individual benefits, including ec-
41. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
43. City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosin Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (city's minority
business utilization plan violated equal protection clause); see for example, Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
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onomic and social assistance, are not yet part of the conception
of rights, perhaps because we still hear ancestral voices declaim-
ing the limited purposes of government. The welfare system is
underdeveloped--the product of the political process, and subject
to its limits and budgetary restraints. There is tension between
the aspiration to freedom, resisting governmental intervention,
and the aspiration to security and welfare, inviting more gov-
ernment.
In France, freedom is primarily not freedom from law but
freedom through law. Its deepest commitment is to rights pro-
tected and nurtured by Parliament. The law and the institutions
it has established protect the individual against the executive.
The law also nurtures individual rights and helps realize them
in fact. And it includes, as affirmative obligations of govern-
ment, as individual rights, the economic and social benefits of
the welfare state. Any ambivalence about government interven-
tion seems muted.
The single page of the French Declaration, Lord Acton
wrote, proved stronger than the armies of Napoleon. In our
day, too, the influence of the French Declaration has been
strong: on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on in-
ternational covenants, and on the constitutions of many states
in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. French influence has in-
cluded its conception of rights as protected by law, including,
therefore, in principle, comprehensive legislative programs to
promote and ensure civil and political rights. France has also
helped bring into the world's constitutional idiom economic and
social rights inspired by socialism. But, of course, France has
not been an influence for subjecting the parliament and the law
to effective constitutional restraints. That rights can be suspended
by the President in emergency has found response; alas, in many
countries (unlike France), it has not remained a hypothetical
power. Even in France and her political progeny, however, the
American conception of rights as superior law, protected also
against the parliament by independent, nonpolitical, judicial in-
stitutions, has captured imaginations."
Rights Ahead
Whether the French and American systems of constitutional rights
continue to converge will, of course, depend upon the future development
of constitutional rights within each system. The full implications of the
44. Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1582, 1596-97 (1981).
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incorporation of the French Declaration remain to be explored, and
what the Declaration will mean for the future of French constitutional'
jurisprudence may well turn upon the imagination and the activism of
the Conseil and its growing strength within the French system of gov-
ernment. If France takes the Declaration seriously as an instrument of
positive law, it may take France where the United States might not
follow. For example, for the Declaration "[L]iberty consists of being
able to do everything which does not harm others. The exercise of the
natural rights of each individual has no limits other than those which
guarantee the exercise of these same rights to the other members of
society. . ... " "The law may only prohibit actions which are harmful
to society. ' 4 These provisions may be read to exclude paternalism, to
guarantee a right to die, to smoke, or to dispense with wearing safety
helmets or seat belts. Again, the Declaration seems to reflect a strict
notion of the proper purposes of punishment: the law may establish
only punishments that "are-strictly and evidently necessary." The Dec-
laration seems to require that just compensation be paid in advance of
the taking of property for public use. Does the requirement in the
Declaration that all citizens be taxed "according to their means" require
a particular kind or degree of progressive taxation?47At a time of joint celebration, it is not inappropriate to ask whether
France and the United States might learn from each other. Historically,
both France and the United States have been proud, independent, even
"isolationist," each reluctant to follow or to admit that it is following
or borrowing from others. Yet, as regards constitutional rights, each
can learn from the other, and both could learn from contemporary
international developments. It need not require formal constitutional
amendment, only traditional techniques of constitutional adaptation and
interpretation. If France can constitutionalize economic-social rights, the
45. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, arts. 4, 5.
Jefferson also noted, "Laws provide against injury from others; but not from ourselves."
2 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 100 (P. Ford ed. 1894). Compare The Constitution
of 1791 Title I, art. 3. These seem to prefigure John Stuart Mill's later articulation of
the "harm principle."
46. French Declaration, supra note 45, art. 8.
47. French Declaration, supra note 45, art. 17 (compensation for taking of property)
and art. 13 (taxation according to means).
There is some evidence that the French Declaration was not completed and that some
of the framers intended additional provisions. The 1791 Constitution, and the Declaration
of 1793 adopted by the National Convention and placed at the front of the 1793 Con-
stitution, contain also what may be the first articulations of economic and social rights.
Title I of the 1791 Constitution "guarantees as natural and civil rights" "a general
establishment of public relief' and "a system of public instruction" (art. 3) (emphasis
in original). The 1793 Declaration declares as rights public assistance for the needy (art.
21) and education (art. 22).
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United States can consider entrenching such rights, if only in state
constitutions or by adhering to international agreements. The French
system of constitutional review before a law is finally enacted offers a
number of advantages; it could not be adopted by the United States
without major adjustments in its constitutional jurisprudence, but the
states might experiment with it, as some have authorized their courts
to issue advisory opinions. France in effect grants members of Parliament
"standing" to question the constitutionality of impending legislation; it
may be time for the Supreme Court to regularize and refine the rules
regarding the standing of members of Congress to challenge legislation
or the actions of the other branches of government. 4 Following the
French (and other) examples, the United States could take steps toward
regularizing the obligation of the national and state governments to
support, protect, and promote rights.
France could learn from the United States. It might look to United
States jurisprudence on liberty, especially on freedom of expression. It
might consider some of the elements of the United States adversarial
system, for example, the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination. The emergency power that the French President enjoys
under the present Constitution cries for some constitutional limitation.
The Conseil is not a complete answer to the need for constitutional
review. Following the lead of the United States, France would do well
to provide for review of laws that have already been enacted, if only
by some agency that would advise Parliament on the compatibility of
existing law with constitutional rights so as to promote repeal or mod-
ification.4 9
Two hundred years ago both nations undertook new initiatives in
government. Both committed themselves to individual rights and to the
consent of the governed. The United States maintained its commitment
to rights, while progress towards democracy tarried. France, on the other
hand, steadily developed democratic institutions and representative gov-
ernment; rights followed slowly and, in constitutional terms, recently.
The United States has moved from rights to democracy, France has
moved from democracy to rights. Today, the rights systems of the two
countries have largely converged.
France, it appears, has now finally put its Revolution behind her.
It is on a steady course of constitutional democracy, democracy subject
to rights. With the latest movement to further integration in the European
48. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979); Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
49. The present President of the Conseil, M. Robert Badinter, has suggested giving
a citizen the right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. Interview, Le Monde,
March 3, 1989, at 1.
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Community, ° emphasis on La Nation may now perhaps give way to
attention to L'Europe, itself perhaps an offspring of the Revolution and
a confirmation of its coming of age.
The United States has made no movements to any "more perfect
union" with other countries and none seems to be obviously needed.
But it too has yet to complete the lessons of cooperation. This year
marks not only the two hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights and
of the French Declaration but also the fortieth anniversary of the Uni-
versal Declaration which indeed helped make the idea of the rights of
man virtually universal. The influence of the French Declaration and
the United States Bill of Rights upon this development has been sub-
stantial, more substantial no doubt than the influence of the armies of
Napoleon and of the United States. But if the idea of rights is to have
even the measure of realization it has had in France and in the United
States, both countries will have to lead to that end. Both have to
continue to eliminate deficiencies in the example they set for others.
Both have to assume leadership in the international human rights move-
ment. The United States in particular must adhere to international human
rights instruments, cooperate in strong peaceful measures against gross
human rights violations, and dedicate itself to help others realize in the
coming century the eighteenth century commitment to human dignity.
50. Single European Act, done at Luxembourg, Feb. 17, 1986, and at the Hague,
Feb. 28, 1986, in force on July 1, 1987, O.J. L169, p. 29, E.C. Bull. Supp. 2186.
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